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DEFINING POPULATION FOR
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
Joshua M Rosenberg*
The one person, one vote doctrine requires that electoral districts
within a state have equal populations. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the doctrine has two stated goals: equal representation and
equally weighted votes. Equal representation requires jurisdictions to
have an equal number of persons residing within each district.
However, in order to achieve the goal of equally weighted votes, each
district must have an equal number of voters. The Court has refused to
explicitly adopt a bright-line population measure, finding that the
matter is best left to the states. However, whenever a state 's
redistricting plan does not employ a measure based on an equal
number of persons, courts almost always strike down the plan as
unconstitutional. This Article contends that courts should afford a
reasonable range of deference to a state's chosen population measure
because states should have the freedom to choose their own policies of
representation. Under the "reasonable range of deference" standard,
states should still follow the one person, one vote mandate that districts
must have equal populations. However, this standard views the dual
aims of the doctrine-equal representation and equally weighted
votes-as political preferences for a state and not as exact
constitutional requirements.
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the 2000 decennial census, the State of New York
redrew its congressional districts so that each district had an equal
number of persons.' New York's twenty-nine congressional districts
had approximately 654,360 people per district.2  This measure
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1. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. Id. at 285. Population deviations were plus or minus one person. Id. at 285 n.6.
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included every man, woman, and child residing within the district.
However, Michael Kalson, a registered voter of New York's
Fifteenth Congressional District, pointed out that an equal number of
persons did not translate into an equal number of voters.3 Out of the
654,361 people residing within his district, only 497,192 were old
enough to vote." In contrast, New York's Sixteenth Congressional
District had a voting-age population of only 428,285.' Therefore,
Kalson argued that his vote was "worth less" than the votes of people
residing in the Sixteenth District because his district included nearly
70,000 more people of voting age.6
In Kalson v. Paterson, Kalson brought suit against the governor
of New York and New York election officials for violating the one
person, one vote principle ("OPOV"). 7  OPOV is the doctrine that
courts use to determine whether a jurisdiction's redistricting scheme
violates the U.S. Constitution.8 Under OPOV, districts must have
equal populations at the congressional, state, and local levels.9 The
objective of OPOV is to achieve political equality 1°-a theory that
enables members of a constitutional democracy to participate equally
in the political decision-making process. "
Political equality in the context of apportionment has two goals.
First, political equality seeks to ensure equal representation in the
election process. 12 Meeting this goal requires jurisdictions to have
an equal number of persons residing within each district ("Equal
Persons"). The Equal Persons measure ensures equal representation
because it guarantees equal access to elected representatives. 13
Second, political equality requires each vote to be equally
3. Id. at 285.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 285 n.8.
6. Id. at 285.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 17-18 (1964),
9. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 475-76 (1968) (local legislative districts);
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18 (congressional districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964)
(state legislative districts); see also infra Part II.A.
10. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566.
11. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY, at xi
(1989); see also infra Part II.A and accompanying text.
12. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14.
13. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
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weighted. " To meet this goal, each district within a jurisdiction
must have an equal number of voters ("Equal Voters"). "5 The Equal
Voters measure prevents vote dilution because an equal number of
eligible voters in each district theoretically translates to equally
weighted votes. 6
If no significant variation exists between the total number of
people in a district and the number of eligible voters, then the Equal
Persons and Equal Voters measures will achieve the same result-
equal representation and equally weighted votes. " However, if there
are substantial demographic deviations within a state, then the result
will be different; the Equal Persons measure will produce unequally
weighted votes, whereas the Equal Voters measure will produce
districts with unequal numbers of residents. 8
The U.S. Supreme Court has never adopted a particular measure
of equality as a bright-line rule because the question has been
"carefully left open" for the states to decide as a political matter. "
However, when a state does not use the Equal Persons measure,
courts almost always reject that state's redistricting schemes on the
grounds that the schemes violate OPOV. 20 Therefore, despite the
Court's hesitancy to recognize that a bright-line population measure
exists, its jurisprudence demonstrates its implicit adoption of the
Equal Persons measure. In Kalson, Judge Guido Calabresi of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals boldly stated the bright-line rule
that the Supreme Court has refused to recognize-that apportionment
within all states should be based on the Equal Persons measure. 2'
14. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
15. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 2008).
16. Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 782 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). There are three requirements for voting eligibility: an individual
must be over eighteen, must be a citizen, and must register to vote. See THOM FILE, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, VOTING AND REGISTRATION OF THE ELECTION IN 2006, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS 3 (June 2008), available at http://www.census.govlprod/2008pubs/p20-557.pdf In
2006, there were roughly 220 million voting age citizens in the United States. Id. at 2. However,
only 68 percent of these citizens registered to vote and 48 percent actually voted in the
congressional election. Id.
17. Garza, 918 F.2d at 781.
18. Id.
19. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966).
20. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969); Kalson, 542 F.3d at 283.
21. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 289 n .16 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Contrary to Judge Calabresi's opinion in Kalson and the
Supreme Court's OPOV jurisprudence, this Article contends that any
bright-line rule will fall short of political equality because states have
different demographic variances. In states with low levels of
variance, a bright-line application of the Equal Persons or the Equal
Voters measure is not detrimental because the number of persons is
substantially equivalent to the number of voters. On the other hand,
in states with high demographic variance, choosing one measure
means sacrificing the goal of the other. For example, using the Equal
Persons measure may result in unequally weighted votes, while using
the Equal Voters measure may result in unequally represented
persons. Thus, in high-variance states, a bright-line rule deprives
states of their ability to choose between competing theories of
political equality. This deprivation violates the principles of
federalism because states should ultimately decide their own policies
of representation. Moreover, states are better suited to respond to
their populations' unique representational needs. Accordingly, the
courts should afford a reasonable range of deference to a state's
chosen population measure. Under this "reasonable range of
deference" standard, states should still follow OPOV's mandate
requiring districts to have equal populations. However, this standard
views the dual aims of OPOV-equal representation and equally
weighted votes-as political preferences for a state and not as exact
constitutional requirements.
Part II traces the development and application of population
measures for OPOV. Part III elaborates on the Equal Persons and
the Equal Voters measures, and considers the benefits and drawbacks
of each approach. Part IV argues that the courts should defer more
often to the states' respective population measures because the
decision is a matter of policy. Part V concludes that a reasonable
range of judicial deference is more likely to achieve political equality
because a bright-line population measure would not be equally
effective for all states.
II. HISTORY OF OPOV
Traditionally, courts were not involved in reapportionment
decisions because of the political question doctrine. 22 Under this
22. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
doctrine, courts are not allowed to review matters that can only be
resolved through the political process. 23  However, this judicial
forbearance ended in 1962 with Baker v. Carr. In Baker, the
plaintiffs challenged Tennessee's apportionment plan because the
population deviations among districts diminished the voting power of
some individuals.24 The U.S. Supreme Court held that redistricting
disputes were justiciable controversies because they implicated a
"constitutional deprivation." 25 Therefore, despite the political nature
of reapportionment, the Court held that judicial correction was
warranted.26
To determine whether an apportionment scheme caused a
constitutional deprivation, the Court developed the OPOV principle.
According to OPOV, states must draw district boundaries to ensure
that each district within a jurisdiction has an equal population. 27 The
purpose of this principle is to achieve political equality through two
stated goals: equally represented persons based on the Equal Persons
measure, and equally weighted votes based on the Equal Voters
measure. The Court clarified that a state is free to adopt its own
population measure so long as it meets the constitutional
requirements of OPOV. 28 Yet the history and current application of
OPOV demonstrate the Court's tendency to overrule any measure
other than the Equal Persons measure.
A. The Court Formulated OPOV to
Achieve Political Equality
The Supreme Court created OPOV to preserve political equality
in the redistricting process. Unfortunately, political equality in this
context is an ambiguous concept. The Court has interpreted it to
mean that individuals have a right to "fair and effective
representation" 29 and a right to "full and effective participation"" in
the political process. Through OPOV, the Court framed these rights
23. Id.
24. Id. at 188-90.
25. Id. at 229-30.
26. Id. at 237.
27. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1964).
28. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1966); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586.
29. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
30. Id.
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in terms of equal representation and equally weighted votes. 3
However, the Court's view of political equality is unclear because
the Court has not stated who possesses these rights (i.e., whether they
apply to citizens, voters, or all persons).32 Further, the Court has not
explained how a state should balance these rights when they conflict
with each other. " Ultimately, political equality in the context of
reapportionment should involve balancing the rights of equal
representation and equally weighted votes in a manner that best suits
a given state's representational interests and policies. "
The Supreme Court first articulated OPOV in two parallel cases
decided in 1964. The first case, Wesberry v. Sanders, 35 addressed
disproportionate populations in congressional districts. In Wesberry,
Georgia citizens challenged the state's congressional districting plan
because of extreme population variances among districts. 36 For
example, Georgia's Fifth Congressional District contained 823,680
people, whereas the Ninth District had a total population of only
272,154.37 Since only one congressperson represents each district,
residents of the Fifth District claimed their votes did not have the
same weight as the votes of other Georgians. " The Court agreed and
invalidated the state's districting scheme. 39 The Court reasoned that
to achieve political equality, Article I, Section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution commands "as nearly as is practical one man's vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." 4
0
In addition to equal voting strength, the Court added that
proportionate representation was also a fundamental goal of
OPOV. 4' Thus, on the congressional level, Wesberry established that
political equality requires districts within a state to have equal
31. Id. at 576.
32. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 283-84 (2d Cir. 2008).
33. Id.
34. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
35. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
36. Id. at 2-3.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 2-3.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 7-8.
41. See id. at 18.
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populations. Thus, the Court measured population according to the
Equal Persons measure. 4 2
The second foundational OPOV case was Reynolds v. Sims,43
where the Court applied the OPOV principle to state legislative
districts. In this case, Alabama residents challenged the
apportionment plans of the state legislature, asserting that the uneven
population counts among districts deprived residents of equal voting
rights." The Court struck down the legislative scheme as
unconstitutional, using the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause as its doctrinal source.45 The Court held that
legislative districts must be apportioned on a population basis,46 and
that political equality included the "right of a citizen to equal
representation and to have his vote weighted equally with those of all
other citizens."47 Although the Court discussed political equality in
terms of voters and citizens, it used the Equal Persons measure as the
basis for the ruling in this case. "
Wesberry and Reynolds illustrate that the Court adopted OPOV
to achieve political equality. The Court framed political equality
through OPOV's dual aims of equally represented persons and
equally weighted votes. However, the Court's view of political
equality is ambiguous because it did not explicitly define the relevant
population for OPOV.
B. Courts Defer to a State's Population Measure
in Theory, but Apply the Equal Persons Measure
as a Bright-Line Rule in Practice
Courts insist that they defer to states to determine the
appropriate measure of equality, yet they consistently impose the
42. See id. at 8.
43. 377 U.S 533 (1964).
44. Id. at 540.
45. Id. at 568.
46. The Court demands absolute equality for congressional districts, but allows minor
population deviations on the state and local level. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732-33
(1983). According to Professor Richard L. Hasen, "[n]either constitutional text nor theory
appears to explain the Court's divergent treatment." RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 24 (2003).
47. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576.
48. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966). In Burns, Justice Brennan stated that
"total population figures were in fact the basis of comparison in [Reynolds]." Id.
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Equal Persons measure on every state. 49 Subsection 1 discusses
courts' implicit endorsement of the Equal Persons measure.
Subsection 2 analyzes the only case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a state's use of the Equal Voters measure.
1. Courts Typically Reject State Population Measures
That Do Not Follow the Equal Persons Measure
The foundational OPOV cases-Wesberry and Reynolds-
measured population based on Equal Persons. However, the Court
emphasized that states have the freedom to choose their own
population measure, absent any constitutional violations. " In fact,
the Court often discussed OPOV in terms of Equal Voters, "making
no distinction between the acceptability of such a test and a test
based on [Equal Persons]."' Nevertheless, subsequent OPOV
jurisprudence shows that courts tend to strike down state
apportionment plans that do not use the Equal Persons measure.
Courts cite the OPOV aim of equal representation to explain
their rejection of the Equal Voters measure. For example, in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, " the Court invalidated a Missouri
congressional districting plan for violating OPOV.53 The total
population per district varied from about 420,000 to 445,000. " To
justify the unequal number of persons per district, Missouri claimed
its redistricting plan was based on the Equal Voters measure. "
Missouri adopted this measure because of the strong military
presence in the state and the large number of students attending
universities. 56 Thus, the percentage of eligible voters would differ
greatly from district to district if Missouri used the Equal Persons
measure. 5  However, the Court struck down Missouri's scheme,
reasoning that a deviation of approximately 25,000 people among
congressional districts did not meet the "as nearly as is practicable"
49. See, e.g., Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 289 n.16 (2d Cir. 2008).
50. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586.
51. Burns, 384 U.S. at 91.
52. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
53. Id. at 534-35.
54. Id. at 529 n.1.
55. Id. at 534.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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standard for congressional districts.58 Although Wesberry used this
language to describe the OPOV goal of equally weighted votes, the
Kirkpatrick court applied the "as nearly as is practicable" standard to
the goal of equal representation.59 The Court's focus on equal
representation is an implicit rejection of the Equal Voters measure
that Missouri chose, and it indicates the adoption of a bright-line
Equal Persons measure.
Similarly, in Garza v. County of Los Angeles,"6 the Ninth Circuit
overturned a local redistricting plan that was not based on the Equal
Persons measure. The plaintiffs challenged Los Angeles County's
apportionment system, which was based on its citizen voting-age
population. 6 The County chose this Equal Voters measure because
a large concentration of non-citizen Hispanics lived in one district. 62
Therefore, the County contended that "a redistricting plan based
upon [the Equal Persons measure] ... unconstitutionally weights the
votes of citizens in that district more heavily."63 However, the Ninth
Circuit found that the County's population measure violated the
Equal Protection Clause because "basing districts on voters rather
than [persons] results in serious population inequalities across
districts."' The court held that the Equal Persons measure was the
more appropriate measure because "[tihe purpose of redistricting is
not only to protect the voting power of citizens; a coequal goal is to
ensure 'equal representation for equal numbers of people."' 
65
Even though courts theoretically defer to a state's chosen
population measure, Kirkpatrick and Garza show that courts
generally apply the Equal Persons measure if the state fails to do
so. 66 This threat of judicial intervention may explain why a majority
58. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
59. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 526-29 (1969).
60. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 773.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 774.
65. Id. at 775 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969)).
66. See also Ellis v. Baltimore, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965); Brodhead v. Ezell, 348 F.
Supp. 1244 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
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of states choose to adopt the Equal Persons measure for their
reapportionment plans. 67
2. Exception: Deference to the
States in Burns v. Richardson
Courts generally will not defer to a state if the state uses a
population measure other than one based on Equal Persons.
However, one notable exception exists. In Burns v. Richardson,6"
Hawaii adopted an apportionment plan based on Equal Voters.69
Due to the significant presence of the U.S. military on the island of
Oahu, the state asserted that the Equal Persons measure would
"constitute a substantially distorted reflection of the distribution of
state citizenry."7  The Court upheld the use of the Equal Voters
measure because "a State's freedom of choice to devise substitutes
for an apportionment plan . . . should not be restricted beyond the
clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause."7  Despite this
reasoning, no subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision has upheld a
state's application of the Equal Voters measure.
Burns is significant not only for its use of the Equal Voters
measure, but also for the Court's deference to a state's choice of how
to achieve political equality. Though the Court claims to defer to a
state's chosen population measure in theory, Burns stands on its own
as a court decision deferring to a state in practice on a population
measure other than one based on Equal Persons. Therefore, while
the current system suggests strong judicial preference toward the
Equal Persons measure, Burns demonstrates that an alternate system
giving states more deference to formulate their own population
measures is possible.
67. See Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968); Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000).
68. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
69. Id. at 77. Specifically, the plan was based on registered voters. See infra Part III.B.1.
70. Burns, 384 U.S. at 94.
71. Id. at 85.
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III. MEASURING POLITICAL EQUALITY:
EQUAL PERSONS VS. EQUAL VOTERS
The twin goals of political equality are equal representation and
equally weighted votes. The only time that both of these goals are
met is when there is insignificant variance in the proportion of voters
to persons among districts. Using New York as an example, if the
state's congressional districts, which contained approximately
654,360 persons per district, also all had around 400,000 eligible
voters per district, then the Equal Persons measure and the Equal
Voters measure would be virtually indistinguishable. Either standard
would result in equally weighted votes and equally represented
persons.
However, in high-variance states, the Equal Persons measure
dilutes voter strength, while the Equal Voters measure results in
representational inequality. Thus, demographic deviations make the
attainment of both goals impossible, forcing states to choose between
the Equal Persons measure and the Equal Voters measure. This
section evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of each measure
of equality.
A. Equal Persons
Judge Calabresi is the primary proponent of the Equal Persons
measure of political equality-the measure implicitly adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court. He interprets political equality to mean that
"every member of Congress should be charged with representing the
same number of persons." 72 Judge Calabresi and other proponents of
the Equal Persons measure understand political equality to include
representational rights, such as the right to petition the legislature,
the right to an equal share of government services, and the right to
equal access to elected officials. A broad recognition of
representational rights for people who cannot vote has many
advantages, but the main drawback is the electoral imbalance that it
creates.
72. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 284 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008).
73. See Carl E. Goldfarb, Note, Allocating the Local Apportionment Pie: What Portion for
Resident Aliens?, 104 YALE L.J. 1441, 1452 (1995).
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1. The Equal Persons Measure Benefits Representational Rights
The Equal Persons measure of political equality recognizes that
representational rights include more than the right to vote. Every
person, regardless of his or her eligibility to vote, has certain rights
by virtue of living in a certain area. 14 These rights include equal
access to elected officials and government services, participation in
the political process, and recognition as a member of the
community. 75
One benefit of using Equal Persons is that it provides an equal
distribution of government attention. Non-voting groups are entitled
to this attention because they pay the same taxes as voting groups. 76
The Equal Persons measure guarantees that all residents similarly
situated have equal access to elected officials and receive an even
distribution of government services.77  This is based on the
assumption that elected officials can obtain services in proportion to
their district's share of the state's total population. " Such services
include medical care, libraries, police service, fire protection, and
waste disposal. "
Another benefit of the Equal Persons measure is its recognition
that non-voting groups still have political participation rights.
Despite their inability to vote, non-voting groups are still represented
by their elected official and have several ways to hold him or her
accountable. For example, non-citizens can influence the political
process by joining political groups and attending political rallies.
Although non-citizens cannot vote, they may express their views to
their elected representative through the petition process.8" In
addition, children do not possess the right to vote, but their parents
arguably represent them by proxy. 81 The Equal Persons measure
recognizes and promotes the political participation of these non-
voting community members.
74. See Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990).
75. See id.
76. See Goldfarb, supra note 73, at 1454.
77. Id. at 1451; see also Garza, 918 F.2d at 781 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
78. Garza, 918 F.2d at 781.
79. See Goldfarb, supra note 73, at 1454.
80. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775 (majority opinion).
81. See Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 MiNN. L. REV. 1463,
1502 (1998).
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Finally, using Equal Persons has a significant normative benefit.
It recognizes that non-voting groups are still members of the
community. Many non-voting groups, including non-citizens, make
valuable contributions to their communities and arguably deserve a
form of political recognition. 8 2 The Equal Persons measure provides
that recognition by including them in the state's apportionment base.
The Equal Persons measure interprets OPOV as standing for
more than just equal voting power. Pursuant to the Equal Persons
measure, political equality can only be achieved if all members of a
community have the same representational rights. By preserving
these rights, the measure shows that every individual is politically
relevant.
2. The Equal Persons Measure Creates an Electoral Imbalance
The greatest disadvantage of the Equal Persons measure is its
tendency to create unequal voting strength among districts in states
with substantial demographic variances. This result seems contrary
to Wesberry, which held that one vote-not one person-should be
worth as much as another vote in a different district. 83
One major source of demographic variance is the non-citizen
population, which is growing rapidly in the United States. 84
According to the 2000 Census, approximately nineteen million non-
citizens live in the United States. 85 For states with low non-citizen
populations, such as Montana, Michigan, South Dakota, and
Vermont, the Equal Persons measure is unlikely to produce a
significant disparity between the number of people and the number
of voters among districts. 8 6 On the other hand, in states like New
York, California, and Florida, which have substantial demographic
variance, using Equal Persons often results in a significant difference
in the number of voters among districts.87
82. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 775-76.
83. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
84. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STuD., THE IMPACT OF NON-CITIZENS
ON CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT, Dec. 6th, 2005, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/
2005/sactestimonyl 20605.html.
85. Id.
86. See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 1269, 1283 (2002).
87. Id.
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For example, a court-ordered redistricting plan in Los Angeles
County utilized the Equal Persons measure. 88 Under this measure,
each district had approximately 1,780,000 persons.89 Among these
districts, the number of voting-age citizens ranged from around
700,000 in District 1 to 1,000,000 in District 5.90 Thus, a person's
vote in District 5 was worth 7/10 of a person's vote in District 1.
Arguably, this vote dilution violates the clear command of Reynolds,
which held that a citizen is entitled "to have his vote weighted
equally with those of all other citizens." 9'
The Equal Persons measure looks beyond OPOV's literal
meaning because, under that measure, one person does not
necessarily constitute one vote. Though using Equal Persons serves
OPOV's goal of equal representation, this measure creates an
electoral imbalance in states with high demographic variance.
B. Equal Voters
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the primary proponent of the Equal Voters measure, was
the first legal scholar to point out that the Equal Persons and the
Equal Voters measures were competing theories. 92 According to
Judge Kozinski, the Equal Voters measure means that every vote
should have the same theoretical weight.93  The Equal Voters
measure guarantees that, regardless of a district's total population,
there are an equal number of voters in each district within a state. "
By equalizing the number of voters, the Equal Voters measure
prevents the dilution of a person's vote in comparison to voters in
another district within the same state. 95
Unlike the Equal Persons measure, the Equal Voters measure
remains highly speculative and is rarely upheld as valid in OPOV
jurisprudence. 96 There are several variations of the Equal Voters
88. Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. Id. at 773 n.4.
90. Id. at 773 n.5.
91. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
92. Garza, 918 F.2d at 781-82 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at781.
94. Id. at 782.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 783-84.
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measure, such as registered voters population, voting-age population,
and citizen voting-age population. A review of these concepts
demonstrates that the Equal Voters measure improves electoral
balance, but often diminishes representational rights.
1. The Registered-Voters Measure Is a Pure Form of the Equal
Voters Measure but Risks Harm to Representational Rights
The registered-voters measure exemplifies the Equal Voters
measure because it creates districts based on the number of people
who are eligible to vote. The registered-voters measure is arguably
the most literal representation of OPOV because it attempts to
equalize the number of eligible voters, thereby creating a
mathematical system where one person amounts to one vote. 97
In addition, the registered-voters measure focuses on protecting
the right to representation of the individual voter. 98  Professor
Sanford Levinson agrees that there is enough case law to substantiate
this "individualist" interpretation. 99 In Hadley v. Junior College
District, 100 the Court held that "a qualified voter has a constitutional
right to vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied,
debased, or diluted." ' Under this conception, OPOV is founded on
the personal nature of the right to vote. 1"2
A measure based on registered voters is the only Equal Voters
measure that the U.S. Supreme Court has ever upheld. In Burns, the
Court ruled in favor of Hawaii's use of registered voters as a basis
for apportionment. 103 Oahu's share of Hawaii's total population was
79 percent, whereas its share of persons registered to vote was 73
percent. "0 The disparities among Oahu's districts were even more
noticeable because of the uneven distribution of military residents,
97. Obviously, there is no way to know whether all registered voters will actually vote until
the day of the election. Thus, it is practically impossible to create a system where one person
actually amounts to one vote without any mathematical deviation.
98. Garza, 918 F.2d at 782 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. See Levinson, supra note 86, at 1286.
100. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
101. Id. at 52.
102. See Garza, 918 F.2d at 782 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 90-93 (1966).
104. Id. at90.
Spring 2009]
724 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 42:709
most of whom were not registered voters. 105 According to Judge
Kozinski, Burns did not use Equal Persons because "raw population
did not provide an accurate measure of whether the voting strength
of each citizen was equal." 1o6 Thus, the registered-voters measure
was an effective basis for political equality because it offset
significant differences in voting power among districts.
However, the use of the registered-voters measure presents
several problems. First, this measure makes voting the sole basis for
political equality. 107 Therefore, the system is vulnerable to
"improper influences" whereby political powers can manipulate the
voting population and diminish the representation of groups entitled
to participate in the electoral process. "8 Second, the measure may be
practically unworkable. The number of registered voters may vary
per election, depending on the controversy of issues and the
popularity of candidates. ,"9 Finally, an equal number of registered
voters in each district does not necessarily translate into an equal
number of votes. 110 In 2006, roughly 71 percent of all registered
voters actually voted in congressional elections. ' As such, the
number of actual voters was probably not as evenly distributed as the
number of registered voters. Thus, while the registered-voters
measure improves electoral balance, it does not guarantee exact
equality in voting power among districts.
2. The Voting-Age Measure Does Not Embody the
Equal Voters Measure Because It Has the Same
Drawbacks as the Equal Persons Measure
A second variation of the Equal Voters measure uses the voting-
age population. In Kalson, the plaintiff argued that the voting-age
measure was the appropriate proxy for OPOV. 112 The plaintiff lived
105. Id. "[T]he ninth and tenth districts contained 28% of Oahu's population but only 17% of
its registered voters; the fifteenth and sixteenth districts, with only 21% of island population
contained 29% of island registered voters." Id. at 91 n. 18.
106. Garza, 918 F.2d at 784 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. See Burns, 384 U.S. at 92.
108. Id. Bribery is one possible improper influence. See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts
of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1040-41,
1061, 1064 (2005).
109. Burns, 384 U.S. at 93.
110. See FILE, supra note 16, at 2.
I11. Id.
112. Kalson v. Paterson, 542 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 2008).
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in a congressional district with a total population of 654,361
residents, of which 497,192 were of voting age (eighteen years or
older). 113 He maintained that his vote had less weight in comparison
to a district with fewer voting-age residents, resulting in
unconstitutional vote dilution. "' Judge Calabresi's opinion,
however, did not accept the validity of the Equal Voters measure. 115
Even if that measure did apply, Judge Calabresi reasoned that the
voting-age population measure did not serve as a valid proxy for
equal voting power. 116 Even though the use of the voting-age
population eliminates minors from the relevant population, non-
citizens, felons, and other ineligible voters are still included in that
measure. 117 While this standard would preserve representational
rights for some non-voting groups, the voting-age population
measure unacceptably discriminates against minors. Although
minors, unlike non-citizens, do not pay taxes, the Court has stated
that they still have a right to petition their elected representative. 118
3. The Citizen Voting-Age Population Measure Is
an Effective Version of the Equal Voters Measure but
Still Diminishes Representational Rights
A third variation of the Equal Voters measures uses the citizen
voting-age population ("CVAP"). 119 Like voting-age population,
CVAP eliminates minors from the apportionment base. Further,
CVAP does not include aliens, transients, and other non-citizens in
its population tally. CVAP basically limits the relevant population to
eligible voters, though not necessarily the ones who have registered.
Thus, CVAP, unlike the registered-voters measure, is not susceptible
to the risk of improper political influences. 120 Courts also cite CVAP
as a potentially valid measure when "large numbers of those
ineligible to vote are disproportionately concentrated in certain
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 289-90.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 289.
118. Garza v. County of LA., 918 F.2d 763, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1990).
119. Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 522-23 (5th Cir. 2000).
120. See Timothy Mark Mitrovich, Comment, Political Apportioning is not a Zero-Sum
Game: The Constitutional Necessity of Apportioning Districts to be Equal in Terms of Both Total
Population and Citizen Voter-Age Population, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1261, 1278 (2002).
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areas." 121 However, CVAP is not as accurate as the registered voters
measure in terms of voter turnout. 122 Only 48 percent of the CVAP
voted in the 2006 congressional election, whereas 71 percent of
registered voters cast ballots in the election. 123 Also, like other forms
of the Equal Voters measures, CVAP deprives children and non-
citizens of representational rights. Therefore, while CVAP bears a
strong resemblance to registered voters, CVAP is less likely to
produce equally weighted votes. Furthermore, CVAP possesses the
same primary drawback as registered voters-the diminution of
representational rights.
4. The Equal Voters Measure Favors Voting Rights, Whereas
the Equal Persons Measure Supports Representational Rights
The Equal Voters measure protects individual voting rights by
creating equally weighted votes, which prevents vote dilution. A
state is likely to adopt the Equal Voters measure if there are
concentrated populations of ineligible voters within the state. 124 A
state may also use Equal Voters to remedy a history of vote
dilution. 125
In contrast to the Equal Voters measure, the Equal Persons
measure focuses on membership and community by protecting
representational rights. These rights include equal access to
government officials and services, political participation, and
symbolic representation. 126 One factor that may lead a state to adopt
the Equal Persons measure is a desire to preserve the political voice
of non-voting groups. A state may also favor an apportionment plan
based on the Equal Persons measure if the state wants to maintain an
even distribution of government resources for its constituents. 127
The Equal Persons and the Equal Voters measures have
strengths and weaknesses that states should closely consider when
121. Chen, 206 F.3d at 524.
122. See FILE, supra note 16, at 3.
123. Id. at 1-2.
124. Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
125. See Darren Rosenblum, Deconstructing the Image Repertoire of Women of Color:
Parity/Disparity: Electoral Gender Inequality on the Tightrope of Liberal Constitutional
Traditions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1119, 1131-32 (2006).
126. Garza, 918 F.2d at 775 (majority opinion).
127. See Goldfarb, supra note 73, at 1444.
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deciding between these measures. The Equal Persons and the Equal
Voters measures both serve essential aspects of political equality.
Therefore, the success of either measure should rely on how a state
chooses to define political equality.
IV. COURTS SHOULD GRANT A REASONABLE RANGE OF
DEFERENCE TO A STATE'S CHOSEN POPULATION MEASURE
Courts defer to a state's measure of population in theory, but not
in practice. In Kalson, Judge Calabresi's contention that
apportionment within all states should be based on Equal Persons
makes explicit what courts already do implicitly. However, the
application of a bright-line rule is improper because it deprives states
of their autonomy over the reapportionment process. Judge
Calabresi and the U.S. Supreme Court have legitimate concerns
about using measures other than the Equal Persons measure.
However, courts should give states a reasonable range of deference
because the issues of apportionment are ultimately policy decisions.
Therefore, federalism mandates that courts should defer more often
to states, who are the actors best suited to make these sorts of
decisions.
A. The Principles of Federalism Support Increased
Judicial Deference to a State's Apportionment Plan
Federalism involves the allocation of power between the state
and federal governments. 128 Under a federalist system, the federal
government cannot interfere with state sovereignty "within the realm
of authority left open to [the states] under the Constitution." 29 This
authority includes "traditional government functions" such as police
powers, economic restrictions, and public services. '30 The Framers
of the U.S. Constitution feared that a strong federal government
would undermine the states' capacity to function as political entities
and weaken their political identity. 3' Under the Constitution's
division of authority, the Framers viewed states as "distinct and
128. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 546 (majority opinion).
130. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
131. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568-70 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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independent [forms] of. . . supremacy." 32 Therefore, the Framers
integrated the concept of federalism into the Constitution to preserve
states' rights. 133
Under the principles of federalism, federal courts have a
constitutional obligation to respect the legitimate interests of the
states. '4  One legitimate concern is a state's representational
interests, ' which is part of the fabric of a state's political structure
and identity. 136 A state promotes its representational interests
through the process of reapportionment. "' Subsection 1 analyzes
Georgia v. Ashcroft' 38 to explain why states, rather than courts,
should have the power to make apportionment decisions, including
the choice between population measures. Subsection 2 discusses
Upham v. Seamon ' to elaborate on how courts should determine the
amount of deference they give to the states with respect to these
decisions.
1. States Should Have the Ultimate Authority to
Choose Population Measures for Reapportionment
Defining population equality is a decision that involves
weighing the tradeoffs of competing theories of representation.
Since these tradeoffs often involve matters of policy, the states,
rather than the courts, should have the right to ultimately decide
which population measure should be applied.
In the context of reapportionment, the Court has recognized a
state's right to choose between competing theories of representation.
For instance, in Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court adjudicated a dispute
involving Georgia's 2001 redistricting plan. "' Georgia sought
approval of its plan under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
132. Id. at 570 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
133. Id. at 560.
134. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REv. 779, 812 (1998).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
139. 456 U.S. 37 (1982).
140. 539 U.S. at 461.
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("VRA"). 141 Section 5 requires that a state's plan preserve the ability
of minority voters to elect a candidate of their choice. 142 The Court
explained that there are two ways for a state to accomplish this: by
creating "majority-minority" districts, or by increasing "influence"
districts. "' In majority-minority districts, a minority group
constitutes the majority of the district's population. "4 In "influence"
districts, a minority group's population does not constitute the
majority but is large enough "to exert a significant-if not decisive-
force in the election process." 115
Georgia's new plan reduced the African-American population in
three majority-minority districts 146 but increased the number of
influence districts. "' The Court upheld Georgia's choice to increase
influence districts because section 5 "does not dictate that a State
must pick one of these methods of redistricting over another." 148
Further, section 5 "gives States the flexibility to choose one theory of
effective representation over the other." 149 Therefore, the Court
deferred to the State's chosen mode of representation and held that
the plan did not violate section 5 of the VRA. 50
The Court's deference in the context of the VRA is analogous to
OPOV because both principles involve competing theories of
representation involving reapportionment. To satisfy the VRA, a
state can preserve minority-voting power by either creating majority-
minority districts or increasing influence districts. To satisfy OPOV,
a state can equalize district populations by using either the Equal
141. Id. at 465. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires that before a covered
jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or procedure" goes into effect, it must be precleared
by either the Attorney General of the United States or a federal court to ensure that the change
"[does not] have the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). Georgia is a covered jurisdiction that
requires preclearance. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 905 (1995).
142. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 470.
145. Id. African-Americans constitute roughly 30-50 percent of the population in influence
districts. Id. at 471.
146. Id. at 472-73. The African American population dropped in the following three
majority-minority districts: District 2 (60.58 percent to 50.31 percent), District 12 (55.43 percent
to 50.66 percent), and District 26 (62.45 percent to 50.80 percent). Id.
147. Id. at 471.
148. Id. at 480.
149. Id. at 482.
150. Id. at 487.
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Persons or the Equal Voters measures. In Georgia, Justice O'Connor
explained that "the State's choice [for redistricting] ultimately may
rest on a political choice of whether substantive or descriptive
representation is preferable." "'
Pursuant to the VRA, a state may decide that its constituents are
better off having fewer majority-minority districts and more
influence districts in order to increase a minority group's overall
representation. 152 Similarly, under OPOV, a state should be able to
decide whether the Equal Persons measure or the Equal Voters
measure is preferable. For instance, if a high-variance state uses
Equal Persons, a number of individuals will suffer vote dilution.
However, a greater number of people might benefit from the
preservation of their representational rights. Thus, a state should be
able to decide whether favoring one right over another will be more
beneficial for its constituents.
The political choice of preferred representation also involves a
number of factors specific to a state. In the context of the VRA, a
state can gauge a minority group's political rights by "the
comparative position of legislative leadership, influence, and power
for representatives of . . . majority-minority districts." "' OPOV
parallels the VRA because there are several factors a state must
consider to gauge political equality. Such factors include the
political visibility of non-voting groups in a community, the current
distribution of government services, and the relative voting strength
of eligible voters in different districts. ' Since these factors vary
from state to state, a bright-line population measure would not
account for states' differing needs. Therefore, as the similarities
between the VRA and OPOV illustrate, the choice between
population measures is a political decision best left to the states.
2. Courts Should Only Review a State's Reapportionment
Plan if There Is a Clear Constitutional or Statutory Violation
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that courts must defer to a
state's apportionment plan unless there is a constitutional or statutory
151. Id. at 483
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part III.B.4.
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violation with respect to that plan. ' Yet, whenever states apply the
Equal Voters measure, courts almost always reject the apportionment
plan and implement the Equal Persons measure. 156 The courts'
justification is that the Equal Voters measure violates the
constitutional aim of equal representation. 157 Strangely, courts have
yet to reject the Equal Persons measure as a violation of the
constitutional aim of equally weighted votes. 158 Based on the courts'
reasoning, the Equal Persons and the Equal Voters measures should
always violate the Constitution in high-variance states because in
these states, neither measure is capable of achieving OPOV's dual
constitutional aims. As a result, judicial review of a state's
respective apportionment plan appears arbitrary and infringes on
states' political rights.
To make judicial review less arbitrary, courts should defer to a
state's apportionment plans absent a clear constitutional violation.
For example, in Upham v. Seamon, the Texas legislature submitted
its congressional reapportionment plan for approval to the U.S.
Attorney General, as required by the VRA. ' The Attorney General
objected to two of the state's congressional districts because the
legislature did not meet its burden of demonstrating that the plan was
"nondiscriminatory in purpose and effect." 160 The district court
devised its own plan for the two districts to remedy the violation. 161
Texas Republican party officials challenged the district court's plan
because it did not respect the State's political policy. 162 Here, the
State's policy for the two districts was to create a "safe seat" in
response to interests expressed by minority voters. 163 Since this
policy did not violate the Constitution or the VRA, the Supreme
155. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1982).
156. See supra Part II.B.1.
157. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Garza v. County of L.A., 918 F.2d
763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990).
158. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 n.7 (1964).
159. Upham, 456 U.S. at 38.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 40.
163. Id. at 39-40.
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Court held that the district court must adhere to the policy with
respect to the two districts. 164
Upham established that courts must not interfere with a state's
apportionment plan unless there is a statutory or constitutional
violation. 165 According to Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "[a]
Court seriously committed to principles of federalism would apply
Upham with rigor and persistence." 166 The courts' prior history of
rejecting the use of Equal Voters technically abides by the Upham
rule because it violates OPOV's aim of equal representation.
However, courts should view the dual aims of OPOV more as
alternative political preferences and less as exact constitutional
requirements. Currently, OPOV consists of two constitutional
aims-equal representation and equally weighted votes-that are
sometimes unable to coexist. 167 This mutual exclusivity creates an
impossible standard that undermines states' autonomy over the
reapportionment process.
The best way to reconcile the dual aims of OPOV with the
principles of federalism is for states to decide which aim best
achieves political equality for their constituencies. The clear
constitutional command of OPOV is that districts within a state must
have equal populations. However, the measure of such equality is a
matter of political policy and preference. Therefore, courts should
give states more discretion so that each state is free to determine
which measure is more appropriate for its unique needs.
B. A Reasonable Range of Deference to a
State's Chosen Population Measure
Will Better Achieve Political Equality
The "reasonable range of deference" standard retains OPOV's
requirement that districts within a state must have equal populations.
However, the standard interprets the dual aims of OPOV--equal
representation and equally weighted votes-as political preferences
164. Id. at 43; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973) ("The only limits on
judicial deference to state apportionment policy . . . [are] the substantive constitutional and
statutory standards to which such state plans are subject." (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37,
42 (1982))).
165. Upham, 456 U.S. at 40.
166. Lowenstein, supra note 135, at 816-17 n.162.
167. See TERRY B. O'RoURKE, REAPPORTIONMENT: LAWS, POLITICS, COMPUTERS 25
(1972).
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for a state and not as exact constitutional requirements. Thus, the
standard limits judicial review of a state's chosen population
measure and implements a more decentralized approach to OPOV.
Subsection 1 details how the Court should apply the "reasonable
range of deference" standard. Subsection 2 considers the drawbacks
of the decentralized framework.
1. Application of the Decentralized Framework
When the Court adopts a highly contested political equality rule
such as OPOV, it should leave room for the states to experiment with
that rule. 68 According to Professor Richard L. Hasen, a noted
election law expert, a strategy of judicial minimalism will enable the
Court to gain more "valuable information before the Court itself
settles upon the ultimate contours of a political equality rule." 169 By
adopting a "reasonable range of deference" standard, the Court
allows states to experiment with different ranges of deference. This
experimentation will help the Court figure out exactly how much
deference is reasonable.
The decentralized framework does not suggest that courts give
complete deference to states' chosen population measures. In Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 170 Justice Stewart proposed a
system where states would have the freedom to adopt their own
measure of political equality. '17 However, his standard suggested
that states did not have to base their measures on population. 72
Rather, he argued that the Court should uphold a state's
apportionment plan so long as the plan was rationally related to the
state's needs and did not systematically frustrate "the will of a
majority of the electorate of the State." 173
The "reasonable range of deference" standard is not as lenient as
Justice Stewart's proposal. According to Professor Hasen, Justice
Stewart's standard would have caused "[1]ong and protracted
litigation over virtually every state's apportionment." 171 Unlike
168. See HASEN, supra note 46, at 48.
169. Id. at 49.
170. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
171. Id. at 751.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 753-54.
174. See HASEN, supra note 46, at 58.
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Stewart's plan, a "reasonable range of deference" standard would
keep OPOV's judicial manageability because districts would still
have equal populations. However, the standard would also curtail
the Court's vigilant application of the Equal Persons measure.
Subsequently, states will have more flexibility to articulate
population measures tailored to their representational needs and
political policies.
OPOV provides states with the foundation for political equality.
By giving states a reasonable range of deference to choose their
preferred population measure, the Court enables states to construct a
system more suitable to their constituents. This minimalist strategy
will likely provide the Court with enough information to place limits
on the amount of deference given to the states.
2. Potential Drawbacks of the Decentralized Approach
Like any new proposal, negative consequences may arise from
using a decentralized framework for measuring population. First,
giving states more flexibility to measure their respective populations
may encourage partisan or racial gerrymandering. The more leeway
and opportunity that incumbents have to redraw district lines, the
more likely they are to draw them in favor of themselves and their
personal interest groups. 175 Next, divergent definitions of
"population" may create inconsistencies at the congressional level.
Not all 435 members of the House of Representatives would be
elected based on the same definition of "population." This may
increase litigation under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
which mandates that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of
the several States" 176 and "Representatives . . . shall be apportioned
among the several States . . . according to their respective
Numbers . . . ." "' Finally, the absence of a bright-line population
measure may provide the states with even less guidance about how to
apply OPOV. 178
175. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review
of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2004).
176. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
177. Id. § 2, cl. 3.
178. See Levinson, supra note 86, at 1274.
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These criticisms have merit but ultimately fail to counter the
utility of a decentralized framework. First, while a relaxed
definitional approach may give redistricting authorities more latitude
to apportion districts, a "principle of population equality does not
prevent any State from taking steps to inhibit gerrymandering." 1
79
Such safeguards include the VRA, which prevents racial
gerrymandering. 180 Next, while Article I, Section 2 dictates that
representatives shall be elected "by the People of the several States,"
the text of the Constitution does not specify whether each state has to
use the same population measure. 1"1 Finally, the idea that OPOV
requires districts to have equal populations describes a principle
rather than a mathematical formula of measuring a district's relevant
population. 182 OPOV provides sufficient guidance to the states
because it requires districts to have equal populations. If OPOV
were to also control how states measure their relevant population, the
principle would provide less guidance and further invade the
sovereignty of the states.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted OPOV to achieve political
equality. Under OPOV, political equality means that districts within
a state must have equal populations. However, the Court
purposefully did not define the relevant population because it
claimed that this was a matter best left to the states. Nevertheless,
OPOV jurisprudence demonstrates that the Court heavily favors
apportionment plans based on Equal Persons. According to Judge
Calabresi, this is why the Court should finally recognize the Equal
Persons measure as a bright-line rule.
If the Court continues to explicitly impose the Equal Persons
measure on all states, or continues to do so implicitly, then it will
continue to not only violate the fundamental principles of federalism,
but also weaken the political identity of the states. If, instead, the
Court grants to the states a reasonable range of deference to choose
179. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 n.6 (1983).
180. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
181. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cI. 1.
182. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) ("Mathematical exactness or precision
is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.").
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their preferred population measure, then the Court will clarify the
current ambiguity in OPOV.
